My take on why the acquisition price was so low: Airtable lacked a good VP sales that reshape pricing. Here is the story:
⢠Airtable built a great database builder, a revolutionary tool
⢠The front end (i.e. interfaces) was never great, only the back-end was
⢠Some tools came in to compensate that: Stacker, Softr, Glide, etc. They offered much better front end, with fine permission management, etc.
⢠But in doing so, those tools by-passed entirely Airtable's per seat pricing logic
⢠Which means companies built with a few creators having paying seats and many users interacting with the data via a 3rd party tool, without paying a seat for that
⢠Airtable became a database that's charging per seat. Which does not make any sense. They ended up extracting little of the value they generate.
⢠The original promise to replace Excel was gone because of the way Airtable customers used Airtable.
To me that's the true story. Some will say "nah, that's because vibe coding replaced low coding". I don't buy that.
If I had been Airtable's CRO, I'd have done this:
⢠Bring Airtable front end to same level as Stacker / Softr. With an acquisition or two if needed
⢠Put Sam as "SVP of frontend" to bring Airtable front end to even higher level. Best in class.
⢠Put Michael as "SVP of ecosystem" and develop strong connections so customer don't "bring Airtable and Hubspot in Glide" but just "bring Hubspot in Airtable"
⢠Increase to 100M records limit
⢠Optional: cut connections to companies who syphon my seats (Noloco, if not acquired)
What do you think?