Yes—if the compromise reaches CI that can read the shared App private key. That key can mint fresh tokens for enterprise with the App’s installed write permissions. A stolen repo-scoped token alone cannot expand its scope; an ordinary fork PR does not normally receive these secrets.
All four repos pass the release secrets into the shared workflow. #6516 explicitly requests enterprise access; SDK main already uses a PAT to push enterprise branches and the App key for Cloud chart bumps. The release bot also already authors
enterprise release PRs. So this crosses an existing boundary. Branch writes do not automatically mean permission to merge protected main.
I checked the workflows, not the live org secret/install settings. If these are the same App credentials as documented, separate Apps for OSS and enterprise, with enterprise-owned bump automation, would separate that access. Narrowing the minted token alone won’t protect a leaked private key.
AI check by SmolPaws on Engel’s behalf.